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1. Introduction
Let V be a set, and call the elements of V voters or players. A subset
AV is called a coalition. The compliment V&A of a coalition A is
denoted A . A set of coalitions S is a game if all supersets of winning
coalitions are winning as well.
A coalition AV is said to be blocking (in S) if A  S. The set of all
blocking coalitions is denoted S*, and is called the dual of S, since
(S*)*=S. A game S is simple if A # S (A wins) implies A  S (A blocks);
i.e. SS*. Conversely, a game S is strong if A  S (A blocks) implies A # S
(A wins); i.e. S*S.
Given a weight wi # N for each voter i # V=[1, 2, ..., n] and a quota q # N,
we can define the quota game (w1 , w2 , ..., wn)q=[AV : i # A wiq].
Democracy over an odd number of voters is a strong simple game.
Dem2n+1=(11. . .1
2n+1
)n+1=[A[1, ..., 2n+1] : |A|>n].
Similarly, dictatorships are also strong simple games.
Dictn=(100. . .0
n&1
)1=[A[1, ..., n] : 1 # A].
Strong simple games are also called voting schemes since they provide an
effective method by which a group of voters may combine their individual
preferences into a group decision for one of two choices.
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Shapley and Billera studied composing such games into ``tournaments''
G[H1 , ..., Hn]. Each of the n players in the game G represents the winning
coalition in a game Hi . Interpreted as voting schemes, G[H1 , ..., Hn], is a
``bureaucracy.'' The voters of each Hi vote independently as ``committees''.
The group decisions of each Hi are inputs to the collective choice function
G which combines the decisions of the n committees.
Games formed from simpler games in this way are said to be decom-
posable, and all others are said to be prime. [3, 18] Obviously, all games
can be factored into prime components. This decomposition is not
necessarily unique unless we restrict our attention to full games. A full
game is one in which each voter appears in at least one minimal winning
coalitions. (Voters which appear in no minimal winning coalitions are
called dummies.) The decomposition of full games into prime games is
unique (up to rearrangement of parenthesis, see Eq. 1). This is Shapley and
Billera's game theoretic analog of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic.
Shapley and Billera also studied simple games, and proved the ``funda-
mental theorem'' for them. Up to associativity (Eq. 1), all simple games have
a unique factorization into prime simple-games. Note that a prime simple-
game is a simple game which has no non-trivial decompositions into simple
games; it may very well have decompositions into non-simple games.
Analogously, certain numbers such as 2 have decompositions among the
Gaussian integers (i+1)(1&i) although they have none among the integers.
Unique decomposition of strong games into prime strong-games holds
by a simple duality argument.
A[B1 , ..., Bn]*=A*[B1*, ..., Bn*]
where G* is the set of blocking coalitions for G, i.e. coalitions whose com-
pliment is not in G.
The main result of this paper will be the proof of the ``Fundamental
Theorem'' of strong simple games, namely, all full strong simple games
have unique decompositions into prime strong-simple-games.
The notion of strong simple games has arisen independently in a number of
contexts. They can be interpreted as voting schemes or social choice functions
[6], as ipsodual elements of the free distributive lattice [19], as members of the
free median set [15, 16, 14], as self-dual anti-chains (or clutters) [13], as maxi-
mal intersecting families of sets [5, 12], as (ultra)-filters [4], as non-dominated
coteries [20], or as critical tripartite hypergraphs [1, 2]. Games are thought
of in reliability theory as semi-coherent structure functions [17, 7]. Linear
programmers tend to think of games as boolean functions; threshold functions
(or majority games or quota games) in particular are of special interest [12, 8].
Each rediscovery of a theory gives birth to alternate notation and termi-
nology. An attempt has been made here to choose a consistent terminology
121fundamental theorem of voting schemes
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which makes our results as clear as possible. The above references are
useful in adapting our results to other fields of interest.
In the sequel to this article [14], we will relax the condition that all
committees be disjoint.
2. Prime Games
Once a certain number of voters have voted, the game can be reduced
to the remaining voters by considering what sets of remaining voters
together with the voters who have already voted ``yes'' are needed in order
to win. More formally, given a game S and a coalition of voters CV, let
IC (S) be the function from the set 2C of subsets of C to the set FD(C) of
games on the set C defined as follows:
(IC (S))(B)=[AC : A _ B # S].
The notation FD(C) derives from the fact that when ordered by inclusion,
these games form the free distributive lattice with 0 and 1 generated by the
set C. 0 =<=(0. . .0)1 is the all losing game, whereas 1 =2C=(0. . .0)0
is the all winning game. Obviously, S is completely determined by the
function IC (S). Note that (IC (S))(B)*=IC (S*)(C &B).
Given a game S on n voters, and n games T1 , ..., Tn on disjoint sets of
voters V1 , ..., Vn respectively. Then one can define the composition of S with
T1 , ..., Tn to be the set of coalitions AV1 _ } } } _ Vn such that
[i: A & Vi # Ti] # S. In other words, S[T1 , ..., Tn] is the game in which the
voters vote by committee. Each committee votes according to its own rules
Ti and results are combined via the game S.
Let C2 be the two-element poset [0, 1] with 0<1. n-player games can be
associated with weakly increasing functions fS : C n2  C2 . The composition
S[T1 , ..., Tn] corresponds to the function
fS b ( fT1 _ } } } _fTn): C
k1+ } } } kn
2  C2
where ki=|Vi |.
These compositions obey the following associative law:
S[T1[U11 , ...], T2[U21 , ...], ...]=(S[T1 , T2 , ...])[U11 , ..., U21 , ...]. (1)
That is to say,
( fS b ( fT1 _fT2 _ } } } )) b (( fU11 _fU12 _ } } } )_( fU21 _fU22 _ } } } )_ } } } )
=fS b (( fT1 b ( fU11_fU12 _ } } } ))_( fT2 b ( fU21 _fU22 _ } } } ))_ } } } ).
122 d. e. loeb
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These compositions involve voting by committees in which each committee
is divided into subcommittees, or equivalently voting by committees whose
results are passed through ``super-committees'' before being combined.
For example, the American presidential voting scheme is the composi-
tion of a 52-voter quota game1 with 52 subgames.
A smaller yet non-obvious example is the following: the weighted game
(2, 2, 1, 1, 1)4 is given by the composition Dem3[Dem1 , Dem1 , Dem3].
The following trivial decompositions are true for all games S.
S=Dem1[S] (one committee), (2)
and
S=[Dem1, ..., Dem1] (one-person committees). (3)
A strong simple game S is said to be a prime strong-simple-game if all
its decompositions into strong simple games are of the form 2 and 3. We
will prove the following result concerning prime strong simple games.
Theorem 2.1. All full strong simple games admit unique decompositions
into prime strong-simple-games.
Note however that games with dummies do not in general have unique
decompositions. For example, if V=W _ D where all the voters in D are
dummies, then S=Dict2[S |W, T] where S |W is the restriction of S to W
(i.e. S |W=[AW : A # S]=S _ 2W ) and T is any game on D.
The important concept in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is the committee. We
shall first define and study committees, and then conclude this section with
the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Consider two coalitions W, CV. Say that W depends on C if
W _ C=< and W  S but W _ C # S. In other words, W loses, but could
win with the help of C, or equivalently IC (S){0 , 1 .
Let S be a strong simple game. Define a committee of S to be any set of
voters CV such that S=T[U1 , U2 , ...] where U1 is a strong simple game
on C. By Equation 3, all singletons [v] are committees, and by Equation 2,
V itself is a committee. S is a prime strong-simple-game if and only if these
are its only committees.
123fundamental theorem of voting schemes
1 The 52 committees correspond to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the United
States House of Representatives. Each state (and DC) has a weight given by its number of
electoral votes. The House of Representatives votes only in the case of a tie in the electoral
college. Thus, the weight of the House can be taken to be 1.
The strong simple game adopted by each state is that of democratic vote among the (hope-
fully odd number of) eligible voters. The actual voting structure of the house is a weak simple
game. The 435 congressmen vote in 50 committees, one for each state. If a state is tied, or the
50 states split evenly, there is no provision for breaking the tie.
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The following technical lemma gives other equivalent definitions.
Lemma 2.1. Let S be a strong simple game on a set V, and let CV.
Then the following are equivalent:
1. C is a committee of S. That is to say, S=T[SC , ...] where SC is a
strong simple game on C.
2. IC (S): 2C  FD(C) takes at most one value other than 0 , and 1 (and
exactly one other value, namely the game SC if the members of C are not all
dummies).
3. IC : 2C  FD(C ) takes at most two values (and exactly two if the
members of C are not all dummies).
4. The set [D # min(S) : D & C{<] of minimal winning coalitions
which include some member of C is equal to [A _ B : A # A, B # B] where
A and B are antichains in 2C and 2C respectively. (SC is the unique filter
such that A=min(SC).)
5. Let S (W)C =[AC: W _ A # S]. (i.e., S
(W)
C indicates exactly what
coalitions AC constitute a win along with W.) Then when they are not
the empty set S (W)C =S
(W$)
C for any two sets W, W$C , and can be written
simply SC .
Moreover, SC denotes everywhere the same strong simple game on C.
Proof. Suppose (1). Then S=T[SC , ...] where SC is a strong simple
game on C. (5) now immediately follows. Let
B=min([AV : A depends on C]).
Then (4) follows.
For AC , [IC (S)](A) is clearly equal to 0 when A # S and 1 when A # S.
The remaining possibility is that neither A nor A are winning coalitions. In
that case, the result depends on the committee C, and [IC (S)](A)=SC .
Thus, (2) follows.
Observe finally that a committee unites several votes into a single vote,
thus a poll of C can only choose between two elements of FD(C ).
Moreover, if only one element is in the image of IC (S) then the committee
C has no decisive power; i.e. it consists entirely of dummies. Hence, (3).
Suppose (2). If IC (S) takes only values 0 and 1 , then all the members of
C are dummies, and this C is a committee. Otherwise, let SC be the inter-
mediate value taken. SC is a strong simple game on C since S*C=SC . Now,
let
T=[AC : [IC (S)](A)=1 ] _ [A _ [] : AC , [IC (S)](A)=SC].
Then T is a strong simple game on C _ [], and S=T[SC , Dem1 ,
Dem1 , ...]. Hence, (1).
124 d. e. loeb
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Suppose (3). Let [IC (S)](<)=:. Then : and ;=:* are the two values
taken with :;. Then these two games on C can be combined into the
following single strong simple game T on C _ [] where  is a new
voter:
T=: _ [A _ [] : A # ;].
Let SC=[IC (S)](&1)(;). Then SC is a strong simple game on C, and
S=T[SC , Dem1 , Dem1, ...]. Hence, (1).
Suppose (5). Let W # C . Let S (W)C denote [IC (S)](W). By hypothesis,
S(W)C is either 2
C=1 , <=0 , or a third constant. Hence, (2). K
The following lemma permits us to understand subcommittees.
Lemma 2.2. Let S be a full strong simple game on V. Let D be a com-
mittee of S. Then
1. D inherits a unique voting structure SD from S.
2. If CDV is a committee of S, then C is also a committee of SD
and SC=(SD)C .
3. Conversely, if C is a committee of SD , then C is a committee of S,
and SC=(SD)C .
Proof. (1) By the previous lemma, SC is an inherent property of S
and C and not related to the particular decomposition of S.
(2) Note that [IC (S)](B)=[IC ([ID(S)](B&D))](B _ D). In other
words, the effect of a group of voters leaving the room (see above) is
equivalent if they leave in one group or in two groups.
(3) By hypothesis, S=T1[SD , ...] and SD=T2[(SD)C , ...]. Thus, by
associativity (Eq. 1),
S=(T1[T2 , Dem1 , Dem1 , ...])[(SD)C , ..., ...]. K
Lemma 2.3. Let S be full, and let C and D be two of its committees. C
and D are then either disjoint, or one contains the other.
Proof. First, we treat the following special case: Suppose that
C _ D=V. Without loss of generality, C # S. Thus, IC (S) takes the values
0 and 1 . Thus, the elements of C are dummies. Hence, C=V, and DC.
In general, there are two cases. If C  S then the above reasoning applies.
Otherwise, C # S. Let AC _ D be a coalition which depends on D. Let
Z # min(SD). If Z & C{<, then (A _ Z)&C depends on C. Thus,
Z & C # min(SC) (and visa versa).
125fundamental theorem of voting schemes
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Thus, if Z # min(SD), then
1. either Z & C=<, or else
2. ZC & D, and Z # min(SC).
It is impossible that some Z fall in case 1, and other in case 2, since SD is
a strong simple game.
If 1 is always true, then C & D=<. Whereas, if 2 is always true, then the
members of D&C are all dummies. Thus, by hypothesis, D&C=<, and
DC. K
Lemma 2.4. Let S{Dem1 be a full strong simple game on V. The set of
maximal proper committee of S is a partition of V.
Proof. We have remarked that [v] is a committee. Furthermore, by the
above lemma, no two maximal committees intersect. K
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let [M1 , M2 , ..., Mn] be the maximal commit-
tees of S. Then S=T[SM1 , SM2 , ..., SMn] with
T={A[1, 2, ..., n] : .i # A Mi # S=
is the unique decomposition of S into smaller strong simple games where
T is a prime strong-simple-game. By iterating this process, S can be com-
pletely and uniquely factored into prime strong-simple-games. K
3. Transitive Games
A game S on a set of voters V is called (k&)transitive if it is invariant
under a (k&)transitive group of permutations of V. Such games are also
called fair or homogeneous. [9]
If S is a transitive game on n voters, and T is a transitive game on m
voters, then S[T, ..., T
n
] is a transitive game on nm voters. Thus, the set
A=[n # N : there exists a transitive strong simple game on n voters]
is multiplicatively closed. [9] We also have the following result.
Proposition 3.1. Let S, T1 , ..., Tn be strong simple games. If
S[T1 , ..., Tn] is transitive, and S is also transitive, then the games T1 , ..., Tn
must all be isomorphic transitive strong simple games.
126 d. e. loeb
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By Theorem 2.1 and induction, it suffices to consider S prime.
Proof. Two voters in the same maximal committees must have the
same role. Thus, each Ti is transitive. Moreover, since voters in different
committees must have the same role, there must be an automorphism
mapping any committee onto any other. Thus, the Ti are isomorphic and
S is transitive. K
If we consider k-transitive games, for k2, we find the following result.
Proposition 3.2. All 2-transitive strong simple games are prime
strong-simple games.
Proof. Let S be a non-prime game. Then there exists at least two
proper committees, at least one of which contains at least two voters. So
let x and y be voters in the same committee, and z be a voter in another
committee. (x, y) and (x, z) are not in the same orbit under the action of
Aut(S). Thus, S is not 2-transitive. K
4. Quota Games
Recall the definition of a quota game. In this section, we will examine
quota games in light of our results on the composition of games.
Note that if the total weight of a quota game is 2k+1, then the game
is strong if the quota is at most k+1, and simple if the quota is at least
k+1.
Clearly, if U=S[T1 , ..., Tn] is a quota game, then S, T1 , ..., Tn are all
quota games. S is a quota game given weights for each voter equal to the
total weight of the corresponding committee in U. Similarly, Ti is a quota
game given the same weights for its voters as for the same voters in U.
The converse is not in general true. For example,
S=Dem3[Dem3 , Dem3 , Dem3]
is transitive. However, S{Dem9. (Notice that S is not 2-transitive, or that
S has winning coalitions of cardinality four.) In fact, democracies are the
only transitive quota games.
However, the condition for the converse remain an open question. Under
what conditions is the composition of several strong simple games a quota
game?
127fundamental theorem of voting schemes
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The order of the composants plays an important role. For example,
given S = (2, 1, 1, 1)3 , S[Dem1 , Dem1, Dem1 , Dem3] = (4, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1)6
whereas S[Dem3, Dem1 , Dem1 , Dem1] is not a quota game.2
The composition of several quota games will not in general be a quota
game. Nevertheless, in the following case, new quota games are found. Let
S be a strong simple quota game on a set V. Then
Dem2n+1[ S , Dem1 , Dem1 , ..., Dem1
2n
]
is a strong simple quota game. The members of V conserve their original
weights, and the one-member committees are given identical very large
weights.
See also the examples in [16, 96].
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